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Abstract: 
 
In this paper we investigate how the short selling ban affected stock markets in 
France, Italy, Belgium and Spain and whether the required response was really 
achieved and reflected in the market. Although some argue that the short selling ban 
was needed for the market to get back on its feet, others argue that short selling is a 
tool that improves market efficiency and banning such trading strategy might lead to 
detrimental effects on the market.  
 
Therefore, the purpose of this study was to show whether the short selling ban had a 
positive or negative effect, both in the short-term and long-term, on the financial 
markets. Moreover, to determine whether short selling is an effective tool and 
whether it really drives the stock prices down when the financial markets are going 
through bad moments. Consequently, uncover whether the short selling ban has had 
a permanent impact on the financial markets and whether it really had an effect on 
the FIBS. To do this we used market data and a selection of stock returns, which 
included banned stocks in the FIBS financial markets and non-banned financial 
stocks from non-FIBS before, during and after the short-selling ban in August 2011.   
 
It was found that the short selling ban led to higher volatility in the FIBS countries 
and also had a spill over effect on non-FIBS countries. Furthermore, the impact of 
the short selling ban on volatility was only deemed to be for a short-term period, 
with the exception of Spain. Also, the short selling ban slowed down price discovery 
in Belgium, France and non-FIBS countries, whereas the short selling ban did not 
affect Spain and Italy. Furthermore, all countries including the non-FIBS countries 
illustrated a better price discovery position after the ban was lifted; therefore the 
short selling ban only had a short-term impact on price discovery.  Moreover, there 
was a long-term positive effect on prices with improvement in stock market prices 
for all FIBS countries with a positive impact on non-FIBS countries. However, 
liquidity in all FIBS and non-FIBS countries suffered a short-term negative impact. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Short selling is considered to be a risky type of trading strategy. This due to the fact 
that some professional investors use a trading strategy known as naked short selling, 
whereby the investor does not borrow the stock or insure the feasibility of borrowing 
the stocks before short selling them. Furthermore, it is widely known that some 
investors will do anything in order to have an advantage over their competitors and 
therefore they might make use of false rumours in order to make them believe a false 
story and therefore artificially try to manipulate the price of a stock. (Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 1999).  
 
Regulators have in fact, on several occasions highlighted short selling to be one of 
the factors contributing to the financial crisis. They were convinced that short selling 
activity was a factor of instability in the financial markets and the European Markets 
and Securities Commission (ESMA) decided to impose, on August 2011, a ban on 
France, Italy, Belgium and Spain (FIBS) stock markets (Handjani, Ali, 2012).   
 
Stock exchange regulators argued that short selling activity led to sudden price 
declines in the stock market, which led to higher volatility in the market and lower 
liquidity. However, on the other hand, other analysts and theorists suggest that short 
selling does not really lead to such repercussions (Avgouleas, Emilios, 2010). The 
shares of 56 companies were subject to the short selling ban, of which 10 companies 
are domiciled in France, 28 in Italy, 4 in Belgium and 14 in Spain.  
 
In 2011, the European stock markets saw a huge decline in its stock prices, where in 
the FIBS the most notable price declines were between July and August, with the 
BEL20 (Belgian stock index), CAC40 (France’s stock index), FTSE/MIB (Italian 
stock index) and IBEX (Spanish stock index) declining by approximately 8%, 7.8%, 
7.5% and 7.9% respectively.3 
 
Furthermore, the comparison between the financial stocks and the market’s stock as 
a whole indicate that the decline was even bigger when it came to financial stocks. 
When looking at the financial stocks of the FIBS, the results show that in France the 
decline in the CAC financial stocks in July and August 2011 was 12.61% and 
18.55% respectively. On the other hand, in Belgium the decline in financial stocks 
was similar to the decline in the market as a whole with approximately an 8% 
decline in July and August. In Italy, the FTSE/MIB financial stocks were close to 
8% in July, however the financial stocks suffered a 15.57% decline in August. 
Furthermore, in Spain the IBEX financial stocks were close to the market’s stocks 
with 7.04% and 9.47% in July and August respectively. However, the study can 
conclude that there was a higher devaluation in financial stocks compared to the 
market as a whole, which makes the analysts question such a discrepancy. 
                                                          
3 Data collected from: [http://www.euroinvestor.com/markets/stocks/europe] [viewed on: 
25/10/14] 
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Another interesting observation is that there was a 29.3% decline in financial stocks 
of the FIBS compared to the 20.6% decline in financial stocks in other European 
countries.4 
 
As noted in this study, short selling is a controversial subject amongst various 
analysts and researchers due to the impact it has on the liquidity, volatility and 
market prices. Moreover, although many studies have been carried out on short 
selling bans in general and during the 2008 recession, few researchers have studied 
the impact of the 2011 short selling ban on the FIBS. Therefore, we aim to evaluate 
how the market in the FIBS faired during the 2011 short selling ban and the effects it 
had on such markets. We analyse whether short selling bans really have a negative 
effect on price discovery and whether price discovery tends to slow down when 
there is some negative news. Basically, we investigate whether stock discovery is 
affected negatively by short selling bans. We feel that a study of this kind will be of 
benefit to both academics and regulators in search of solutions to the risks the 
European economies are facing. 
 
1.1 Research Questions 
 
We based our studies on answering the following research questions and the 
following hypothesis: 
 
a. Did the financial stocks perform differently in terms of returns prior to the 
ban?  - here we seek to understand whether the financial stocks where 
performing differently prior to the ban as compared to financial stocks 
performing during normal market environment. If the financial stocks 
performed differently, then the effects of the short selling ban on financial 
stocks would raise another question, i.e. whether the ban really had an 
impact or whether it was due to the financial stocks not performing normally 
that such repercussions occurred during and after the short selling ban.  
b. How did FIBS financial stocks compare to the non-FIBS financial stocks 
during the short selling ban? – here we seek to determine how the banned 
financial stocks in the FIBS faired as compared to the non-banned financial 
stocks in non-FIBS countries. This to show whether the short selling ban has 
a positive impact or not. However it should be noted that different countries 
may have different market scenarios to trade in so certain effects could be 
unrelated to the short selling ban.  
c. What was the impact both in the short-term and long-term of the short 
selling ban on the FIBS’ liquidity, volatility and prices? – here, we seek to 
determine how the short selling ban effected the FIBS’ liquidity, volatility 
and prices and whether the effects where only for a short period or whether 
the effects were of permanent, or long-term nature. 
 
                                                          
4 Data collected from: [http://www.investing.com/indices] [viewed on: 25/10/14] 
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1.2 Hypothesis 
 
H0:As suggested by Beber and Pagano (2010) and Boehmer et. al (2008), short 
selling ban in the FIBS, as well as the short selling ban in general, does not 
contribute to market and stock price stabilisation but leaves stock prices 
unaffected or even worse have the opposite effect on the stock market 
regulators’ intentions to stabilise the market. The study’s results should 
indicate that the higher the average daily number of transaction, the higher 
the market liquidity. The latter therefore suggests that there is no major 
imbalance between supply and demand. 
H1:Short selling ban in the FIBS, as well as the short selling ban in general, will 
contribute to market and stock price stabilisation. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Concerned with the impacts of the European Sovereign debt crisis on their 
respective countries, European Regulators, conducted stress tests on European 
banks. This led to a temporarily ban on short-selling transactions of financial stocks 
in France, Italy, Belgium and Spain (FIBS). Several researchers have tried to test 
and provide evidence for the impact of short selling both on the law of one price (no 
arbitrage opportunities in the markets) and on the financial markets as a whole 
(Gagnon, L., Witmer, J., 2009).  
 
2.1 Impact of Short Selling Restrictions on Liquidity 
 
Beber and Pagano (2011) and Boehmer et al. (2012), in their studies, found that 
short selling bans have a negative effect on liquidity. The former, concluded that 
short selling bans have a detrimental effect on the market’s liquidity. They question 
the regulator’s decision in the U.S. to ban short selling during a time where liquidity 
was fundamental to the markets. They highlight that the median bid-ask spread was 
larger during the short selling ban as compared to bid-ask spreads outside the short 
selling ban period. Noting, that the bid-ask spread was on average 2.27 times larger 
as compared to the pre-ban period and over 3 times larger as compared to the post-
ban period, with Italy’s short selling ban having the most devastating negative effect 
on the market’s liquidity. 
 
In both studies it was found that short selling bans increase the end of day bid-ask 
spreads in the financial markets and therefore implying that liquidity suffers when 
short selling is banned. They also highlight the fact that bid-ask spreads can be 
viewed as an illiquidity measure where the wider the spread, the less liquid the stock 
is. Moreover, they note that even after the ban was lifted, there was illiquidity. 
However the reason could be because the market’s volatility remained very high. 
 
Fotak et al. (2010) agreed with Boehmer et al.’s (2012) findings, that short selling 
bans tend to have an adverse effect on liquidity. However they look at naked short 
   A Study on the Impact of the Short Selling Ban on FIBS 
 
22 
sales (short selling without borrowing). They, highlight the fact, that naked short 
sales have the same impact on the market as covered short sales during trading time. 
Moreover, they note that an increase in naked short selling will lead to a reduction in 
spreads and therefore an increase in liquidity. Furthermore, Fotak et al. (2010) argue 
that naked short selling leads to lower order imbalances (reducing the gap between 
excess supply and demand when major news hits the markets), and therefore 
improving the liquidity. 
 
These views are shared by other researchers namely Gagnon and Witmer (2009) 
who looked at the Canadian markets short selling bans; Battalio and Schultz (2010) 
who reviewed the U.S. stock market during the short selling ban and found that the 
spreads resulted in liquidity costs amounting to over $600 million; Marsh and Payne 
(2010), who looked into the U.K. markets finding that financial stocks had a greater 
impact on liquidity as compared to non-financial stocks in the U.K. markets. 
 
On the other hand, Jones and Lamant (2002) did not agree with the researchers 
above. They argued that during the Great Depression in the U.S., when in 1932 there 
was a requirement that brokers should secure written authorisation before lending a 
shares, reduced liquidity. However, the 1938 requirement, which required short 
selling strategies, only to be executed if there was an increase on the stock, resulted 
in increased liquidity (Beber and Pagano, 2011). Charoenrook and Daouk (2005) 
concur with this finding and note that short selling restrictions in 111 countries they 
studied correlate with greater market liquidity. 
 
2.2 Impact of Short Selling Restrictions on Price Discovery 
 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) concluded that market restrictions tend to slow 
down price discovery and therefore result in an increase in the bid-ask spreads. 
Furthermore, the study concludes that short selling restrictions tend to slow the price 
more in bear markets as compared to the bull markets.  
 
Although, Miller (1977) agrees to this, but contrary to Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1987) argues that short selling restrictions tend to move the price upwards, leading 
to ‘overpricing’ of the stock. 
 
Harrison and Kreps (1978) also conclude that short selling restrictions tend to slow 
down price discovery in the markets. Harrison and Kreps, however assume that all 
investors have the same information and no inside information is known to 
investors.  
 
Biais et al. (1999) conclude similarly, that in the French market when market 
restrictions are imposed good information about the market tends to be reflected 
faster than bad news on the market.  
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Bris et al. (2003) analysed the stock of 47 equity markets around the world and came 
up with two conclusions about the impact of short selling restrictions on price 
discovery. The first conclusion was that short selling does in fact help price 
discovery in the stock markets. The second conclusion was that short selling might 
lead to greater price declines in individual stocks, hence concluding that short selling 
constraints have little or no impact on severe price declines in the markets. 
 
Boehmer and Wu (2010) suggest that being informed does not mean that the market 
prices will immediately reflect the information being given to the traders involved. 
On the contrary, traders who receive information would want to keep that 
information for themselves and not leak it into the market. They suggest that when 
short selling is allowed on the market, market prices tend to react faster to new 
public information, thus concluding that short selling can be a marketing strategy 
that helps the market to reflect price information. Furthermore, they suggest that 
short selling leads to smaller pricing errors and therefore price discovery is reflected 
faster in the market. However, when analysing the impact of short selling restrictions 
on price discovery, they concluded that restrictions tend to hinder price discovery in 
the market. 
 
Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) studied over 25 countries over the period of three years 
in order to analyse how short selling restrictions affect price efficiency. They 
concluded that short selling restrictions do not lead to price instability or high 
negative returns on the affected stocks. 
 
Beber and Pagano (2011) also analyse the impact of the 2008 short selling ban in the 
U.S. on price discovery. They concluded that short selling restrictions tend to slow 
down price discovery especially when bad news is announced on the market. Beber 
and Pagano’s (2011) conclusions are in line with Diamond and Verrecchia’s (1987) 
conclusions, that short selling restrictions tend to slow down price discovery more in 
the bear market as compared to the bull market.  
 
When testing whether it is a good idea for regulators to impose short selling 
restrictions in order to limit the activity of traders in bearish markets and therefore 
slowing down price discovery more in bearish markets as compared to bullish 
markets, Beber and Pagano (2011) found that, short selling bans slow down price 
discovery more in bearish markets as compared to bullish markets. 
 
2.3 Impact of Short Selling Restrictions on Prices and Returns 
 
Jones and Lamont (2001) conclude that stocks tend to be overpriced when short 
selling bans are imposed on stock markets. They find that some stocks tend to be too 
expensive to be shorted; therefore they are considered to be overpriced in the market 
and yield lower returns. 
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Chang et al. (2007) conclude similarly after analysing the Hong Kong stock markets 
and notes that this impact happens especially for individual stocks. However, in their 
analysis they also consider the investors’ opinion about the stock and conclude that 
the more different the investors’ opinions are the more overvalued the stocks are. 
 
Similar conclusions were reached by Autore et al. (2011), who focused their studies 
on the illiquidity shock and the overpricing of the stocks and Lobanova et al. (2010), 
who focused their studies on the impact of the short-selling ban in the U.S. on 
liquidity, volatility and market efficiency and found that during the 2008 short 
selling restriction in the U.S. returns on banned stocks reduced as compared to other 
periods. 
 
Diether et al. (2007) tested whether short sellers are able to make future decisions 
about their stocks based on new laws enacted by the SEC in 2005. They conclude 
that short sellers tend to be more active in the market when stock prices increase and 
they tend to short less when stock market prices tend to decrease. The latter shows 
that Diether et al. (2007) come to the same conclusion as Biais et al. (1999), that 
short sellers and traders in general tend to react more to bad news than good news. 
However, on the other hand, Diether et al. (2007), do not agree with most 
researchers that the larger the difference between the investors’ opinions, the more 
overpriced the stocks are. In fact, Diether et al. (2007), state that as uncertainty and 
difference of opinions amongst investors grows larger, the more short selling 
activities tend to be executed, therefore having a more efficient market. 
 
Boehmer et al. (2012) agree with Diether et al.’s (2007) reasoning and conclude that 
short selling restrictions do not have any effect on stock market prices. They studied 
banned stocks both during the ban, before and after the ban on those stocks. They 
concluded that there were no exaggerated price changes when comparing the pre-ban 
period and the ban period on the stocks involved, noticing that banned stocks were 
subject to underperformance in the stock market during the ban. Boehmer et al. 
(2007) analysed the abnormal returns of the original banned stocks as compared to 
the cumulative returns to similar never banned stocks. They concluded that the day 
after the ban was imposed, the banned stocks made an average of 6.68% returns as 
compared to the 3.48% for the never banned stocks. Boehmer et al. (2007) also state 
that such a difference could be permanent.  
 
However, the abnormal returns made by the affected institutions could be due to the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) announcement (a program that was intended 
to strengthen market stability and financial institutions) on that same date, on which 
the short selling restriction was imposed. They also found that the day the ban was 
enacted on them the average excess return on the banned stocks was very close to 
zero. Boehmer et al. (2007), suggest that the reason for a close to zero average 
excess return could be that the SEC’s intention to boost the share prices by imposing 
the short selling ban is outweighed by the negative price effects of the short selling 
restriction. 
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Furthermore, Beber and Pagano (2011) also conclude that short selling restrictions 
do not lead to overpricing of stocks in the markets and decline again when the 
restriction is no longer imposed. They, in fact find some overpricing in the U.S. data 
stock market, which could be due to the TARP announcement. However when 
analysing other countries they do not find any overpricing of the stocks when a ban 
is imposed but rather no changes in the stock prices. 
 
2.4 Impact of Short Selling Restriction on Volatility 
 
Charoenrook and Daouk (2005) concluded that short selling leads to less volatility in 
aggregate stock returns and decline the claims that short selling leads to higher 
market volatility. 
 
Bris et al. (2003) study the effect of short selling restrictions on volatility by 
calculating the average standard deviation of individual stock returns and use its 
logs, in order to arrive at the stocks’ real value. They conclude that short selling 
restrictions do lead to higher volatility in the stock market returns. They also notice 
that volatility is even higher is less-developed countries as compared to countries 
with more prestigious governments. These findings are similarly concurred to by 
Beber and Pagano (2011) and Boehmer et al. (2012). 
  
3. Methodology 
 
Using non-probability judgmental sampling we chose 52 banned stocks and 17 non-
banned stocks. The main demographic variable for the study was the weekly excess 
returns of the relevant FIBS (France, Belgium, Italy and Spain) and non-FIBS 
(Germany, Austria, Greece and the Netherlands) financial stocks pre, during and 
post the ban between August 2011 and February 2012. The total frequency of the 
demographic variable (the weekly excess returns) amounted to 8,112 observations 
for the 52 banned stocks and 2,652 observations for the 17 non-banned stocks. Data 
was collected to measure liquidity, volatility and prices before, during and after the 
ban.  
 
One of the main reasons why non-probability judgmental sampling was used for this 
study is due to the accessibility of the stocks and the research requiring a very 
specific group, where specific financial stocks that were subject to the short selling 
ban were needed. Furthermore, some of the financial stocks required for the study 
had either merged or went bankrupt during the period that the study was be carried 
out.  
 
Furthermore, when sampling the non-FIBS stocks, non-probability, judgmental 
sampling was chosen due to the fact that they were influential countries during the 
period the study was carried out. Furthermore, other countries such as Norway were 
not selected due to the stock prices being in their home currency not in Euro. The 
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stocks gathered were then identified from Thomson Reuters and downloaded using 
the add-on onto Ms Excel.  
 
In order to analyse what impact the short selling ban had on liquidity in FIBS 
countries, the average daily number of transactions was deemed to be the most 
appropriate measurement tool. The volume of the respective stocks was downloaded 
from Thomson Reuters. Moreover, in order to determine the daily number of 
transactions, the total number of trades was divided by the number of trading days.  
 
3.1 Price Discovery Approach  
 
In order to estimate the market model, we made use of weekly returns for each stock 
on the corresponding national stock market index from August 2011 to February 
2012 (the ban period). The weekly return data for both the individual stocks and the 
stock market indexes was again downloaded from Thomson Reuters. The reason 
why we chose a weekly frequency is motivated by previous studies, mainly those of 
Beber and Pagano (2011) and Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2007), that find such 
frequency to be the optimal balance between noise and information. To test the 
prediction of price discovery in the study, an estimation of a market model 
regression was made using EViews. The market model makes use of the formula: 
 
 
 
where Y = the weekly returns of the stock (dependent variable); and X = the weekly 
returns of the national stock market index (independent variable). 
 
Furthermore, the reason why we chose the market model to identify price discovery 
is due to the fact that the ban should affect price discovery in terms of a firm-specific 
basis rather than a market-wide informational effect. 
  
3.2    Stock Price Effect Approach 
 
The stock prices of 52 banned stocks from FIBS countries were collected from 
Thomson Reuters, leading to a total of 8,112 observations. On the other hand, 17 
stocks from non-FIBS countries were collected, therefore having a total of 2,652 
observations. The stock market indexes for both the FIBS and non-FIBS countries 
were also collected from Thompson Reuters.  
 
One of the main principles why the short selling ban was enacted in August 2011 
was to provide effective support to the prices of financial stocks. In order to test 
whether the previous statement was true or not, the study focuses on the excess 
returns of the banned stocks in the FIBS and the non-banned stocks in the following 
European countries: Austria, Germany, Greece and the Netherlands (Non-FIBS). 
Excess returns, as defined by Beber and Pagano (2010), is the difference between 
individual stock returns and the respective country’s market index. The stock market 
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indexes chosen for the FIBS are CAC40, FTSE MIB, BEL20 and IBEX 
respectively. The reason why the we chose these respective stocks was due to the 
fact that the stock index represents the most financially liquid and stable companies 
in their respective country. 
   
3.3    Volatility Approach  
 
Volatility defined as the standard deviation of the return provided by the variable 
unit per unit over time when the return is expressed as continuous compounding. In 
this study, only business days are assumed, since volatility tends to be much higher 
during business days than on non-business days, such as weekends and holidays.  
 
In order to calculate volatility, the study makes use of the Generalised 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) (1,1) Model, which was 
proposed by Bollerslev in 1986. The assumption of the GARCH Model is that 
volatility changes with the passage of time. A further benefit of the GARCH model 
is that if it is working efficiently, then autocorrelation should be removed.  
 
Furthermore, in order to work out the GARCH (1,1) Model, we use an add-in of 
Microsoft Excel®, NumXL. The study first identified the weekly returns of the 
respective stock, with the data downloaded from Yahoo! Finance. The next step in 
determining the GARCH (1,1) Model was to work out the weighted moving average 
and the exponential moving averages in order for the study to get an idea of the trend 
of the stock price before, during and after the short selling ban. Furthermore, the 
study calculates and plots the autocorrelation function (acf) and the partial 
autocorrelation function (pacf) in order to measure the correlation between the 
observations, after controlling for observations with intermediate lags. The final step 
of the calculation of the GARCH (1,1) Model was to run the GARCH Model itself 
using the weekly percentage returns of the stock. 
 
3.4    Liquidity Approach 
 
It is only natural that the average daily number of transactions during times of 
distress is lower than during normal periods. However in order to counter such an 
effect the study takes into account both the pre- and post-ban periods, which fall 
within the European Sovereign Debt Crisis period. 
  
3.5    Limitations and Assumptions of the Methodology 
 
The average daily number of transactions analysis may have its restrictions, whereby 
volatility may not be due to the short selling ban but due to other factors, especially 
when considering that the analysis is being conducted during the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis. The market model only assumes the weekly returns for the 
stock market index; however the weekly returns for the financial stocks may be 
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affected by other factors, which are not portrayed in the market model run by the 
study. 
 
The excess returns calculation includes the market benchmark indexes for their 
respective countries. The benchmark indexes however do not represent the whole 
market but rather a small portion with the most powerful companies in the country. 
Furthermore, the benchmark index does not only represent financial industry stocks 
but stocks from the market as a whole, whereas this study focuses only on financial 
stocks.      
 
The GARCH model operates best under stable market conditions; whereas the 
research in question is operating during a crisis therefore the market conditions may 
be fairly unstable. 
 
Although these limitations and assumptions we were still able to give a clear 
indication of the impacts on the short selling ban on financial markets and whether 
the impacts were of a short or long-term nature. The study also used several tests 
that were not used in other papers and analysis of the impacts of short selling bans, 
hence giving an alternative analysis and viewing of the impacts of the short selling 
ban. 
  
4. Findings and Results 
 
The weekly excess returns for each of the 52 banned stocks grouped by their 
respective countries and the 17 non-banned stocks grouped altogether are shown in  
 
Table 1. An illustration of the weekly excess returns of the FIBS and non-FIBS 
countries for the period February 2010 to June 2013.  
EXCESS RETURNS 
Period Belgium France Italy Spain Non-FIBS 
Pre-Ban Period -1.14595% -0.35514% -0.48431% -0.31697% -0.75827% 
Ban Period -0.02556% 0.30488% 1.00363% 0.38407% 0.08546% 
Post-Ban Period -0.08606% 0.47606% 1.01357% -0.14271% -0.00522% 
 
4.1 Volatility:  Belgium 
  
Pre-Ban Period: The volatility proxy by the exponentially moving average 
(EWMA) moved smoothly unlike the weekly returns of the Belgian banned financial 
stocks. Furthermore, it was noted that the volatility proxy by EWMA is more 
sensitive to positive returns as compared to negative returns. The descriptive 
statistics of the Belgian financial stocks interpreted that the weekly returns are 
negatively skewed. However, the skewness of the Belgian financial stocks was not 
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significant at the 5% level of significance. Moreover, the White-noise test did not 
show any signs of serial correlation between returns. As illustrated in Figure 2, the 
GARCH model results were calibrated and all the results, those being the White-
noise, the normal distribution and ARCH, were significant. The GARCH Model 
estimated volatility to be 5.24% before the short selling ban began.  
 
Ban Period: The exponentially moving average (EWMA) volatility proxy moved 
fairly smooth and the study showed that the EWMA is more sensitive to positive 
returns as compared to negative returns. The descriptive statistics of the Belgian 
financial stocks showed that the skewness was positive, however the skewness was 
not significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the White-noise test did not show signs 
of serial correlation between returns.As illustrated in Figure 3 after the GARCH 
model was calibrated all the results were significant. The volatility during the ban 
period was 9.58%, which is a lot higher than the pre-ban period.  
 
Post-Ban Period: The exponentially moving average (EWMA) volatility proxy 
moved fairly smooth and the study showed that the EWMA is more sensitive to 
positive returns as compared to negative returns. The descriptive statistics of the 
Belgian financial stocks showed that the skewness was negative, however the 
skewness was not significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the White-noise test did 
not show signs of serial correlation between returns. As illustrated in Figure 4 after 
the GARCH model was calibrated all the results were significant. The volatility 
during the ban period was 5.46%, which is lower compared to the ban period. 
Furthermore, the results showed that volatility returned to the same approximate 
value as the pre-ban period values. 
  
4.2    Volatility: France 
 
Pre-Ban Period:The volatility proxy by the exponentially moving average (EWMA) 
moved smoothly unlike the weekly returns of the French banned financial stocks. 
Furthermore, it was noted that the volatility proxy by EWMA is more sensitive to 
positive returns as compared to negative returns. The descriptive statistics of the 
French financial stocks interpreted that the weekly returns are negatively skewed. 
However, the skewness of the French financial stocks was not significant at the 5% 
level of significance. Moreover, the White-noise test did not show any signs of serial 
correlation between returns. As illustrated in Figure 5, the GARCH model results 
were calibrated and all the results, those being the White-noise, the normal 
distribution and ARCH, were significant. The GARCH Model estimated volatility to 
be 5.53% before the short selling ban began.  
 
Ban Period : The exponentially moving average (EWMA) volatility proxy moved 
fairly smooth and the study showed that the EWMA is more sensitive to positive 
returns as compared to negative returns. The descriptive statistics of the French 
financial stocks showed that the skewness was positive, however the skewness was 
not significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the White-noise test did not show signs 
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of serial correlation between returns. After the GARCH model was calibrated all the 
results were significant as illustrated in Figure 6. The volatility during the ban period 
was 7.06%, which is a higher than the pre-ban period.   
 
Post-Ban Period: The exponentially moving average (EWMA) volatility proxy 
moved fairly smooth and the study showed that the EWMA is more sensitive to 
positive returns as compared to negative returns. The descriptive statistics of the 
French financial stocks showed that the skewness was positive, however the 
skewness was not significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the White-noise test did 
not show signs of serial correlation between returns. After the GARCH model was 
calibrated all the results were significant as illustrated in Figure 7. The volatility 
during the ban period was 3.58%, which is a lot lower compared to the ban period. 
  
4.3    Volatility: Italy 
 
Pre-Ban Period: The volatility proxy by the exponentially moving average 
(EWMA) moved smoothly unlike the weekly returns of the Belgian banned financial 
stocks. Furthermore, it was noted that the volatility proxy by EWMA is more 
sensitive to positive returns as compared to negative returns. The descriptive 
statistics of the Italian financial stocks interpreted that the weekly returns are 
negatively skewed. However, the skewness of the Italian financial stocks was not 
significant at the 5% level of significance. Moreover, the White-noise test showed 
some signs of serial correlation between returns, therefore the GARCH model had to 
be calibrated. The GARCH Model estimated volatility was 8.40% before the short 
selling ban began (Figure 8). 
 
Ban Period: The exponentially moving average (EWMA) volatility proxy moved 
fairly smooth and the study showed that the EWMA is more sensitive to positive 
returns as compared to negative returns. The descriptive statistics of the Italian 
financial stocks showed that the skewness was positive, however the skewness was 
not significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the White-noise test did not show signs 
of serial correlation between returns. After the GARCH model was calibrated all the 
results were significant. The volatility during the ban period was 9.47%, which is 
higher than the pre-ban period implying that volatility increases during the short 
selling ban period as illustrated in Figure 9.  
 
Post-Ban Period: The exponentially moving average (EWMA) volatility proxy 
moved fairly smooth and the study showed that the EWMA is more sensitive to 
positive returns as compared to negative returns. The descriptive statistics of the 
financial stocks showed that the skewness was positive, however the skewness was 
not significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the White-noise test did not show signs 
of serial correlation between returns. the volatility during the ban period was 6.26%, 
which is lower compared to the ban period. Furthermore, it can be concluded that 
volatility during the short selling ban period increased as compared to periods were 
the short selling ban was not in place. 
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4.4   Volatility: Spain 
 
Pre-Ban Period: The volatility proxy by the exponentially moving average 
(EWMA) moved smoothly unlike the weekly returns of the Spanish banned financial 
stocks. Furthermore, it was noted that the volatility proxy by EWMA is more 
sensitive to positive returns as compared to negative returns. The descriptive 
statistics of the Spanish financial stocks interpreted that the weekly returns are 
negatively skewed. However, the skewness of the French financial stocks was not 
significant at the 5% level of significance. Moreover, the White-noise test did not 
show any signs of serial correlation between returns.The GARCH model results 
were calibrated and all the results, those being the White-noise, the normal 
distribution and ARCH, were significant. The GARCH Model estimated volatility 
was 2.88% before the short selling ban began as Figure 11 illustrates.  
 
Ban Period :The exponentially moving average (EWMA) volatility proxy moved 
fairly smooth and the study showed that the EWMA is more sensitive to positive 
returns as compared to negative returns. The descriptive statistics of the Spanish 
financial stocks showed that the skewness was negative, however the skewness was 
not significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the White-noise test did not show signs 
of serial correlation between returns. After the GARCH model was calibrated all the 
results were significant. The volatility during the ban period was 3.77%, which is a 
higher than the pre-ban period implying that the short-selling ban did have a 
negative effect on volatility (Figure 12).    
 
Post-Ban Period: The exponentially moving average (EWMA) volatility proxy 
moved fairly smooth and the study showed that the EWMA is more sensitive to 
positive returns as compared to negative returns. The descriptive statistics of the 
Spanish financial stocks showed that the skewness was positive, however the 
skewness was not significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the White-noise test did 
not show signs of serial correlation between returns. After the GARCH model was 
calibrated all the results were significant. The volatility during the ban period was 
4.20%, as illustrated in Figure 13, which is a higher compared to the ban period.  
   
4.5   Non-FIBs (Austria, Greece, Germany and the Netherlands) 
 
Pre-Ban Period: The volatility proxy by the exponentially moving average 
(EWMA) moved smoothly unlike the weekly returns of the non-FIBS financial 
stocks. Furthermore, it was noted that the volatility proxy by EWMA is more 
sensitive to positive returns as compared to negative returns. The descriptive 
statistics of the non-FIBS financial stocks interpreted that the weekly returns are 
negatively skewed (-0.74). The skewness of the non-FIBS financial stocks was 
statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. Furthermore, the White-noise 
test was significant and did not show any signs of serial correlation. The GARCH 
Model estimated volatility was 3.99% (Figure 14) before the short selling ban began. 
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Ban Period: The exponentially moving average (EWMA) volatility proxy moved 
fairly smooth and the study showed that the EWMA is more sensitive to positive 
returns as compared to negative returns. The descriptive statistics of the non-FIBS 
financial stocks showed that the skewness was negative, however the skewness was 
not significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the White-noise test did not show signs 
of serial correlation between returns. The volatility during the ban period was 7.25% 
(Figure 15), which is higher than the pre-ban period implying that volatility did not 
only increase in FIBS countries but also in non-FIBS countries.  
 
Post-Ban Period: The exponentially moving average (EWMA) volatility proxy 
moved fairly smooth and the study showed that the EWMA is more sensitive to 
positive returns as compared to negative returns. The descriptive statistics of the 
financial stocks showed that the skewness was positive, however the skewness was 
not significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the White-noise test did not show signs 
of serial correlation between returns.The volatility during the ban period was 3.87%, 
which is a lot lower than the ban period imposed on the FIBS countries. 
  
4.6    Price Discovery 
 
In order to test price discovery, a market model regression was used, where we made 
use of weekly returns for each stock on the corresponding national stock market 
index from February 2010 to February 2013. 
  
4.6.1 Belgium 
Pre-Ban Period: The R2 value of the pre-ban period regression was 0.5227, 
indicating that 52.27% of the total variation in the weekly returns of the financial 
stocks in Belgium is explained by the variation in the explanatory variable (the 
Belgian stock index). Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson statistic is very close to two, 
which implies that there is no serial autocorrelation in the model. The regression 
stated that on average, a one unit increase in the price of a banned financial stock 
increased the stock market index of Belgium by 1.701 units. 
  
Ban Period: The R2 value of the pre-ban period regression was 0.3467, indicating 
that 34.67% of the total variation in the weekly returns of the financial stocks in 
Belgium is explained by the variation in the explanatory variable (the Belgian stock 
index). Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson statistic is fairly close to two, which 
implies that there is no serial autocorrelation in the model. The regression stated that 
on average, a one unit increase in the price of a banned financial stock increased the 
stock market index of Belgium by 2.04 units. 
  
Post-Ban Period: The R2 value of the pre-ban period regression was 0.1856, 
indicating that 18.56% of the total variation in the weekly returns of the financial 
stocks in Belgium is explained by the variation in the explanatory variable (the 
Belgian stock index). Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson statistic is close to two, 
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which implies that there is no serial autocorrelation in the model. The regression 
stated that on average, a one unit increase in the price of a banned financial stock 
increased the stock market index of Belgium by 1.84 units. The latter shows that 
price discovery was fairly less after the ban period. 
 
4.6.2 France 
Pre-Ban Period: The R2 value of the pre-ban period regression was 0.5048, 
indicating that 50.48% of the total variation in the weekly returns of the financial 
stocks in France is explained by the variation in the explanatory variable (CAC40). 
Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson statistic is very close to two (1.995), which implies 
that there is no serial autocorrelation in the model. The regression stated that on 
average, a one unit increase in the price of the banned financial stocks increased the 
CAC40 by 1.16 units.  
 
Ban Period:The R2 value of the pre-ban period regression was 0.5234, indicating 
that 52.34% of the total variation in the weekly returns of the financial stocks in 
France is explained by the variation in the explanatory variable (CAC40). 
Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson statistic is a bit higher but close to two, which 
implies that there is no serial autocorrelation in the model. The regression stated that 
on average, a one unit increase in the price of a banned financial stock increased the 
stock market index of Belgium by 1.323 units.  
 
Post-Ban Period: The R2 value of the pre-ban period regression was 0.4412, 
indicating that 44.12% of the total variation in the weekly returns of the financial 
stocks in France is explained by the variation in the explanatory variable (CAC40). 
Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson statistic is lower but close to two (1.809), which 
implies that there is no serial autocorrelation in the model. The regression stated that 
on average, a one unit increase in the price of a banned financial stock increased the 
stock market index of France by 1.297 units. The latter shows that price discovery 
was fairly less but relatively close to the ban period’s conclusion. 
  
4.6.3 Italy  
Pre-Ban Period: The R2 value of the pre-ban period regression was 0.3374, 
indicating that 33.74% of the total variation in the weekly returns of the financial 
stocks in Italy are explained by the variation in the explanatory variable (FTSE 
MIB). Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson statistic is close to three, which implies that 
there is some degree of serial autocorrelation in the model.The regression stated that 
on average, a one unit increase in the price of a banned financial stock increased the 
stock market index of Italy by 1.024 units.  
 
Ban Period:The R2 value of the pre-ban period regression was 0.3254, indicating 
that 32.54% of the total variation in the weekly returns of the financial stocks in Italy 
is explained by the variation in the explanatory variable (the FTSE MIB). 
Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson statistic is approximately 2.67, which implies that 
there is some degree of serial autocorrelation in the model.The regression stated that 
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on average, a one unit increase in the price of a banned financial stock increased the 
stock market index of Italy by 1.0312 units.  
 
Post-Ban Period:The R2 value of the pre-ban period regression was 0.2857, 
indicating that 28.57% of the total variation in the weekly returns of the financial 
stocks in Italy is explained by the variation in the explanatory variable. Furthermore, 
the Durbin-Watson statistic is close to 2.50, which implies that there is some degree 
of serial autocorrelation in the model. The regression stated that on average, a one 
unit increase in the price of a banned financial stock increased the stock market 
index of Belgium by approximately 1 unit. The latter shows that price discovery was 
fairly less but very similar after the ban period. 
   
4.6.4 Spain 
Pre-Ban Period: The R2 value of the pre-ban period regression was 0.695, indicating 
that 69.50% of the total variation in the weekly returns of the financial stocks in 
Spain is explained by the variation in the explanatory variable (IBEX). Furthermore, 
the Durbin-Watson statistic is fairly close to two (1.704), which implies that there is 
no serial autocorrelation in the model. The regression stated that on average, a one 
unit increase in the price of the banned financial stocks increased the IBEX by 0.711 
units.  
 
Ban Period: The R2 value of the pre-ban period regression was 0.7837, indicating 
that 78.37% of the total variation in the weekly returns of the financial stocks in 
Spain is explained by the variation in the explanatory variable (IBEX). Furthermore, 
the Durbin-Watson statistic is very close to two, which implies that there is no serial 
autocorrelation in the model. The regression stated that on average, a one unit 
increase in the price of a banned financial stock increased the stock market index of 
Belgium by 0.714 units.  
 
Post-Ban Period: The R2 value of the pre-ban period regression was 0.8092, 
indicating that 80.92% of the total variation in the weekly returns of the financial 
stocks in Spain is explained by the variation in the explanatory variable (IBEX). 
Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson statistic is a bit higher but close to two (2.11), 
which implies that there is no serial autocorrelation in the model. The regression 
stated that on average, a one unit increase in the price of a banned financial stock 
increased the IBEX by 1.017 units. The latter shows that price discovery was higher 
than the previous periods. 
 
4.6.5 Non-FIBS 
Pre-Ban Period: The R2 value of the pre-ban period regression was 0.6491, 
indicating that 64.91% of the total variation in the weekly returns of the financial 
stocks in non-FIBS countries is explained by the variation in the explanatory 
variable. Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson statistic is very close to two, which 
implies that there is no serial autocorrelation in the model. The regression stated that 
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on average, a one unit increase in the price of financial stock increased the stock 
market index of non-FIBS by 1.035 units.  
 
Ban Period: The R2 value of the pre-ban period regression was 0.6901, indicating 
that 69.01% of the total variation in the weekly returns of the financial stocks is 
explained by the variation in the explanatory variable. Furthermore, the Durbin-
Watson statistic is lower but rather close to two, which implies that there is no serial 
autocorrelation in the model. The regression stated that on average, a one unit 
increase in the price of a non-FIBS financial stock increased the stock market index 
by 1.292. 
 
Post-Ban Period: The R2 value of the pre-ban period regression was 0.4216, 
indicating that 42.16% of the total variation in the weekly returns of the financial 
stocks is explained by the variation in the explanatory variable. Furthermore, the 
Durbin-Watson statistic is very close to two (1.95), which implies that there is no 
serial autocorrelation in the model. The regression stated that on average, a one unit 
increase in the price of non-banned financial stock increased the stock market index 
by 0.778 units. The latter shows that price discovery was fairly less after the ban 
period.  
 
4.7 Stock Price Effect 
 
The excess returns were calculated in order to conclude whether the short selling ban 
provided support for the prices of financial stocks. The excess returns for all the 
respective FIBS and non-FIBS countries are illustrated in Table 1. 
  
4.7.1 Belgium  
Pre-Ban Period: The pre-ban period’s excess returns for the financial stocks was -
1.15%, which means that of the pre-ban period’s excess returns performed 
negatively on average. 
 
Ban Period: The ban period’s excess returns for the financial stocks was -0.03%, 
which showed that the short selling ban had a positive impact on stock prices.   
Post-Ban Period: The post-ban period’s excess returns for the financial stocks was -
0.09%, which showed that the stocks price returns after the ban was lifted remained 
fairly stable. 
  
4.7.2 France 
Pre-Ban Period: The pre-ban period’s excess returns for the financial stocks was -
0.355%, which means that of the pre-ban period’s excess returns performed slightly 
negative on average.  
 
Ban Period: The ban period’s excess returns for the financial stocks was 0.305%, 
which concluded that the short selling ban had a positive impact on the stock price 
and stocks even achieved a positive return during the ban period. 
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Post-Ban Period: The post-ban period’s excess returns for the financial stocks was 
0.476%, which showed that the stocks price returns after the ban was lifted achieved 
even higher returns than during the short selling ban period. 
  
4.7.3 Italy 
Pre-Ban Period: The pre-ban period’s excess returns for the financial stocks was -
0.484%, which means that of the pre-ban period’s excess returns performed 
negatively on average. 
 
Ban Period: The ban period’s excess returns for the financial stocks was 1.004%, 
which showed that the short selling ban had a very positive impact on stock prices 
and the short selling ban helped the financial stock prices to stabilise and even 
achieve positive returns. 
 
Post-Ban Period:The post-ban period’s excess returns for the financial stocks was 
1.014%, which showed that the stocks price returns after the ban was lifted remained 
fairly similar as compared to the ban period. 
  
4.7.4 Spain 
Pre-Ban Period: The pre-ban period’s excess returns for the financial stocks was -
0.317%, which means that of the pre-ban period’s excess returns performed 
negatively on average. 
 
Ban Period:The ban period’s excess returns for the financial stocks was 0.384%, 
which showed that the short selling ban had a positive impact on stock prices and the 
short selling ban helped the financial stock prices to stabilise and even achieve 
positive returns on the Spanish financial stock market. 
 
Post-Ban Period: The post-ban period’s excess returns for the financial stocks was -
0.143%, which showed that the financial stocks achieved negative returns after the 
ban was lifted. The latter therefore implied that the short selling ban had a positive 
impact on the stock returns. 
  
4.7.5 Non-FIBS 
Pre-Ban Period: The pre-ban period’s excess returns for the financial stocks was -
0.758%, which means that of the pre-ban period’s excess returns performed 
negatively on average. 
 
Ban Period: The ban period’s excess returns for the financial stocks was 0.085%, 
which showed that the short selling ban also had a positive impact on non-FIBS 
countries and the impact of the short selling ban had a positive spill over effect on 
European markets. 
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Post-Ban Period:The post-ban period’s excess returns for the financial stocks was -
0.005%, which showed that the stocks price returns remained fairly stable as 
compared to the ban period. 
  
4.8    Liquidity Effect 
 
The average daily number of transactions helped us to determine how liquidity was 
effected during the ban period. The average daily number of transactions and the 
number of days used for the sample period are illustrated on Table 2. 
 
Table 2. The average daily number of transactions estimating the liquidity effect on 
both FIBS and non-FIBS countries 
Period Number 
of 
Trading 
Days 
Belgium France Italy Spain Non-FIBS 
Pre-Ban 
Period 
240 1,287,297 8,560,709 63,713,976 10,184,79
6 
12,461,315 
Ban 
Period 
210 1,126,516 5,900,042 47,520,115 3,501,143 10,392,511 
Post-Ban 
Period 
240 1,558,545 9,306,577 85,467,063 9,756,563 12,610,011 
 
4.8.1 Belgium 
Pre-Ban Period 
The average daily number of transactions on the banned financial stocks before the 
ban period was enacted was approximately 1.29 million, which is a lot lower than 
the 5.014 million average traded on Euronext BEL20.  
 
Ban Period:On the other hand, the ban period’s average daily number of transactions 
was 1.127 million, which shows a lower amount of number of transactions traded 
and therefore implying lower liquidity. 
 
Post-Ban Period:The post ban period’s average daily number of transactions was 
1.559 million, which shows a higher amount of transactions than the ban period and 
also than the pre-ban period. The latter showed that the liquidity increased 
significantly after the ban period and investors had more confidence to invest in the 
financial markets. 
  
4.8.2 France 
Pre-Ban Period: The average daily number of transactions on the banned financial 
stocks before the ban period was enacted was approximately 8.561 million.  
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Ban Period:On the other hand, the ban period’s average daily number of transactions 
was 5.9 million, which shows a significant amount of reduction in the average daily 
number of transactions traded and a huge loss in market liquidity.  
 
Post-Ban Period: The post ban period’s average daily number of transactions was 
9.307 million, which again shows that after the ban was lifted the average amount of 
number of transactions increased after the ban was lifted implying that the short 
selling ban did have a negative effect on liquidity. 
  
4.8.3 Italy  
Pre-Ban Period: The average daily number of transactions on the banned financial 
stocks before the ban period was enacted was approximately 63.714 million.  
 
Ban Period: On the other hand, the ban period’s average daily number of 
transactions was 47.520 million, which shows an alarming amount of lack of 
transactions traded and a therefore huge loss in market liquidity.  
 
Post-Ban Period: The post ban period’s average daily number of transactions was 
85.467 million, which again shows a huge increase of transactions after the ban was 
lifted. The latter implies that the short selling ban reduced significantly market 
liquidity in the Italian financial stock market.  
 
4.8.4 Spain 
Pre-Ban Period: The average daily number of transactions on the banned financial 
stocks before the ban period was enacted was approximately 10.185 million.  
 
Ban Period: On the other hand, the ban period’s average daily number of 
transactions was 3.501 million, which shows a decline in market liquidity during the 
period the short selling ban was in place.  
 
Post-Ban Period: The post ban period’s average daily number of transactions was 
9.757 million, which again shows a huge increase of transactions after the ban was 
lifted. The latter implies that the short selling ban reduced significantly market 
liquidity in the Spanish financial stock market.  
 
4.8.5 Non-FIBS 
Pre-Ban Period: The average daily number of transactions on the non-FIBS 
financial stocks before the ban period was enacted was approximately 12.461 
million.  
 
Ban Period: On the other hand, the ban period’s average daily number of 
transactions was 10.392 million, which shows a lower amount of number of 
transactions traded and therefore implying lower liquidity. 
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Post-Ban Period: The post ban period’s average daily number of transactions was 
12.610 million. The post-ban period’s results were fairly similar to the pre-ban 
period’s results. 
  
4.8 Theoretical and practical implications 
 
4.8.1 Volatility  
The FIBS’ financial stocks showed relatively higher volatility during the ban period 
as compared to the pre-ban period, which implies that the short-selling ban did have 
a negative impact on volatility in the FIBS stock markets. We came to the same 
conclusions that Bris et al (2003) came to, that is, that short selling restrictions do 
lead to higher volatility in the markets.  
 
The study analysis of the non-FIBS financial stocks yielded the same conclusions as 
that of  the FIBS, that is, that during the ban period the volatility was higher than 
before the ban was imposed. The result could be seen from two different point of 
views. The first point of view being that volatility increased due to other 
circumstances rather than the short-selling ban, whilst on the other hand, the second 
conclusion could be that the short-selling ban had a spillover effect on the volatility 
of other European countries.  
 
Moreover, the study also analysed the period (one year) after the short selling ban 
was imposed. All the FIBS countries, except for Spain, showed that volatility 
decreased significantly after the short-selling ban was lifted. We can then conclude 
that the short-selling ban only had a short-term impact on volatility and there was no 
permanent impact on the financial stocks’ volatility. The reason why Spain had a 
higher volatility after the ban was lifted could be the huge financial stress it was 
under during the time period chosen for the study. 
  
4.8.2 Price Discovery  
The Belgian and French financial stocks were affected by the short-selling ban and 
price discovery slowed down as compared to the period before the ban was lifted. 
However, on the other hand, the Spanish and Italian financial stocks were not 
affected in terms of price discovery when the short-selling ban was imposed. One 
reason for such results could be that the Spanish and Italian financial stocks were 
already under huge stressful conditions (lack of demand and supply for the financial 
stocks), therefore the autocorrelation between the financial stocks and the stock 
market indexes remained fairly similar.  
 
We find that during the ban period, the price discovery of non-FIBS financial stocks 
was also affected, even though the effect was minimal. The reason for such, could be 
that the non-FIBS investors feared that the short-selling ban could be imposed on 
other European countries, therefore the demand for financial stocks in non-FIBS 
countries decreased, affecting the price discovery.  
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The post-ban short-selling period had similar results for Belgium, France and Italy, 
where price discovery improved after the ban period was lifted. In the case of Italy, 
price discovery remained fairly stable over the whole sample period. On the other 
hand, in the case of Spain, price discovery was affected even further after the ban 
was lifted. The main reason for such a conclusion could be the “mini-bailout of 
Bankia” (Financial Times, 2012), which further reduced the demand for Spanish 
financial stocks. The latter implied that in all cases, apart from in the Spanish 
financial stocks, the impact of the short-selling ban on price discovery was only 
temporary. 
  
4.8.3 Stock Price Effect  
Similar to what Boehmer et al. (2012), concluded in their study, we found that short-
selling ban had a positive influence on the financial stock prices of all FIBS 
countries. Similar conclusions resulted for non-FIBS countries. One of the reasons 
for such could be that the short-selling ban on FIBS countries helped European 
markets instil stability and more confidence in the market. The stock prices of the 
banned financial stocks after the ban was lifted remained fairly stable or showed 
slight improvements in all FIBS countries. Therefore, we concluded that the short-
selling ban did not just have a temporary impact on stock market prices but also had 
a positive long-term impact on the financial stock prices of the banned stocks. 
 
4.8.4 Liquidity Effect  
We came to similar conclusions as Beber and Pagano (2011),  that the short-selling 
ban has an adverse effect on market liquidity. The conclusions of the study show that 
all the FIBS countries suffered heavily in terms of market liquidity during the short-
selling ban period. This could be due to the reason that investors fear that more 
stocks will be banned therefore the market flow stagnates leading to less liquidity.  
 
The analysis of the non-FIBS countries liquidity yielded to the same conclusions as 
that for the FIBS countries, however the impact on liquidity was far less. These 
findings could be due to the instability that surrounded the Greek financial crisis, 
whilst on the other hand, non-FIBS countries, such as Germany and Austria, had a 
new record in terms of exports (Spiegel, 2013) and a strong economic performance 
(Deutsche Borse Group, 2012) respectively.  
 
After the ban was lifted, the study concluded that liquidity was higher and at par 
with the pre-ban period in all FIBS countries. Therefore, the short-selling ban did not 
have a long-term impact on liquidity but liquidity was only negatively affected 
during the ban period. 
  
5. Conclusions 
 
The short selling ban led to higher volatility in the FIBS countries and also had a 
spill over effect on non-FIBS countries. Furthermore, with the exception of Spain, 
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the impact of the short selling ban on volatility was only deemed to be for a short-
term period.  
 
Although, the short selling ban did not affect Spain and Italy, it slowed down price 
discovery in Belgium, France and non-FIBS countries. Furthermore, all countries 
including the non-FIBS countries illustrated a better price discovery position after 
the ban was lifted; therefore the short selling ban only had a short-term impact on 
price discovery.  
 
The short selling ban was enacted in order to achieve stability and improve stock 
market prices. This was achieved for all FIBS countries and also had a positive 
impact on non-FIBS countries. Furthermore, the impact of the short-selling ban on 
stock prices was not just temporary but had a long-term positive effect on prices.  
 
One of the main criticisms of the imposition of a short selling ban is that it reduces 
liquidity and the latter was proved in this research, where liquidity in all FIBS and 
non-FIBS countries suffered when the short selling ban was imposed. However, the 
short selling ban only had a short-term impact on liquidity.  
 
As noted, the financial stocks of FIBS countries performed differently in terms of 
returns prior to the ban. In fact, the financial stocks showed more positive results 
during the ban period as compared to the period before the ban was enacted. 
Furthermore, both the FIBS and non-FIBS countries performed in a similar pattern 
during the short selling ban period, with the exception of price discovery where 
Spain and Italy performed differently from the other countries analysed during the 
study.  
 
The short selling-ban affected liquidity, volatility and price discovery negatively, 
however the impact was only of a short-term nature. On the other hand, stock prices 
were affected positively by the short selling ban and the impact was that of a long-
term nature. The latter conclusions contradicted the findings of Beber and Pagano’s 
(2010), that short selling bans leave stock prices unaffected or has a negative effect. 
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Appendix A – Figures 1 to 31 
 
Figure 2 – GARCH model results estimating volatility for Belgium before the ban 
was enacted 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – GARCH model results estimating volatility for Belgium during the ban 
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Figure 4 – GARCH model’s results estimating volatility for Belgium after the ban 
was lifted 
 
Figure 5 – GARCH model’s results estimating volatility for France before the ban 
was enacted 
 
Figure 6 – GARCH model’s results estimating volatility for France during the ban 
period 
 
Figure 7 – GARCH model’s results estimating volatility for France after the ban 
was lifted 
 
Figure 8 – GARCH model’s results estimating volatility for Italy before the ban was 
enacted 
 
Figure 9 – GARCH model’s results estimating volatility for Italy during the ban 
period 
 
Figure 10 – GARCH model’s results estimating volatility for Italy after the ban was 
lifted 
 
Figure 11 – GARCH model’s results estimating volatility for Spain before the ban 
was enacted 
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Figure 12 – GARCH model’s results estimating volatility for Spain during the ban 
period 
 
Figure 13 – GARCH’s model results estimating volatility for Spain after the ban 
was lifted 
 
Figure 14 – GARCH model results estimating volatility for Non-FIBS before the ban 
was lifted 
 
Figure 15 – GARCH model results estimating volatility for non-FIBS during the ban 
period 
 
Figure 16 – GARCH model results estimating volatility for non-FIBS after the ban 
was lifted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 – Market model results estimating price 
discovery for Belgium before the ban was enacted 
 
 
Figure 18 – Market model results estimating price discovery 
for Belgium during the ban period 
 
 
Figure 19 – Market model results estimating price 
discovery for Belgium after the ban was lifted 
 
 
Figure 20  - Market model results estimating price discovery 
for France before the ban was enacted 
 
 
Figure 21 – Market model results estimating price 
discovery for France during the ban period 
 
 
Figure 22 – Market model results estimating price discovery 
for France after the ban was lifted 
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Figure 23 – Market model results estimating price 
discovery for Italy before the ban was enacted 
 
 
Figure 24 – Market model results estimating price discovery 
for Italy during the ban period 
 
 
Figure 25 – Market model estimating price discovery 
for Italy after the ban was lifted 
 
 
Figure 26 – Market model estimating price discovery for 
Spain before the ban was enacted 
 
 
Figure 27 – Market model estimating price discovery 
for Spain during the ban period 
 
 
Figure 28 – Market model estimating price discovery for 
Spain after the ban was lifted 
 
Figure 29 – Market model estimating price discovery 
for non-FIBS before the ban was enacted 
 
 
Figure 30 – Market model estimating price discovery for 
non-FIBS during the ban period 
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Appendix B - DEFINITION OF GARCH (1,1) MODEL 
GARCH MODEL  
 
 
 - GARCH Model  
 - Long-Run Average Variance Rate  
 – Weight Assigned to  
 – Weight Assigned to  
 – Weight Assigned to  
 
 
 
 
Appendix C – FIBS AND NON-FIBS’ CONSTITUENTS  
 
FIBS     
BELGIUM FRANCE ITALY ITALY 
 
 
Figure 31 – Market model estimating price discovery for 
non-FIBS after the ban was lifted 
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